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Abstract
The Internet has introduced a variety of online buying services that expand the
reach of sellers and reduce search costs for buyers. In markets in which traditional
outlets establish prices through bargaining, these online intermediaries have also altered
the price setting process. Perhaps the most well known example is Autobytel.com
which provides referral services in the automobile market. By using Autobytel, a
buyer can obtain a non-negotiable price oﬀer as an alternative to bargaining with a
car dealership. To understand the eﬀect of online referral systems on the price setting
process, we construct a theoretical model of oligopolistic price competition in which
one dealership has an exclusive contract with a referral intermediary. We derive market
conditions under which the ﬁxed price oﬀered through the referral system will or will
not be lower than oﬄine (bargained) prices. Our model provides theoretical insights
relevant to results in the empirical literature addressing t h er o l et h a tA u t o b y t e la n d
other infomediaries play in online markets.
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The rapidly expanding diﬀusion of the Internet into everyday life has altered traditional
interactions between buyers and sellers. The Internet provides many online buying services
that expand the reach of sellers, and reduce search costs for buyers by providing a wealth
of product information, identifying sellers of the product, and comparing prices oﬀered by
several online retailers. A large literature has empirically examined the impact of Internet
retailers on price competition and price dispersion in markets characterized by posted prices.1
An issue that has received much less attention is the impact of the Internet on the price
setting process. The presence of an intermediary or middleman can alter the way in which
prices are established,2 and the Internet has made such intermediaries increasingly common.
For example, eBay enables buyers and sellers to exchange new or used products through an
auction-style mechanism. At the end of 2006, 222 million users were registered on eBay and in
2006 the value of trades on the eBay marketplace exceeded 52.4 billion dollars. Priceline.com
is another example of an infomediary that has introduced a buyer bidding process into
markets traditionally characterized by posted prices by enabling customers to name their
own price for an airline ﬂi g h t ,r e n t a lc a r ,o rh o t e lr o o m . 3
Our article focuses on referral intermediaries like Autobytel in the retail market for auto-
mobiles and seeks to understand how these intermediaries inﬂuence the price setting process.
A key feature of traditional automobile markets is that transaction prices are typically nego-
tiated between the buyer and seller.4 Because buyers often dislike bargaining, the automobile
1Examples include Bailey, 1998; Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000; Clay, Krishnan and Wolﬀ, 2001; Arnold
and Saliba 2002; Baye, Morgan and Scholten, 2001; Penard and Larribeau, 2004. These papers, which have
focused primarily on the markets for books, CD’s, and consumer electronics, all ﬁnd evidence of persistent
price dispersion between online sellers of a homogeneous product.
2For example, Biglaiser (1993) shows that both the average price and the quality of goods tend to be
higher when goods are sold through an intermediary instead of through direct bargaining. See also Wang
(1995), Arnold and Lippman (1993), Spier (1991) or Bester (1994) about the sellers’s choice between posted
prices and bargaining.
3The bid can be accepted or refused by the sellers referred by Priceline. If the bid is refused, then the
customer has the chance to make another bid but only if he modiﬁes the terms of his request (such as
the location or the star level of the hotel). Fay (2004) considers the impact of a bidders ability to submit
repeat bids on Priceline.com’s proﬁta n ds h o w st h a tp r o ﬁt is higher if bidders can be credibly prevented
from submitting repeat bids. Ding et. al. (2005) demonstrate that bids may be inﬂuenced by the emotional
response of bidders based on whether bids submitted in the past were accepted or rejected.
4The notable exception is Saturn which sells cars at the non-negotiable sticker price. Saturn has a
well-known reputation for adhering to its “no-haggling” policy.
1market represents an opportunity for online intermediaries. In particular, an online interme-
diary can facilitate the simultaneous use of multiple pricing mechanisms by a given dealer.
Autobytel.com enables automobile dealers to oﬀer a posted price to buyers who contact the
dealer through Autobytel.com and to bargain with buyers who contact the dealer through
other channels. In addition to accessing detailed product information (such as standard
features and options, safety ratings, and dealer invoice pricing), a prospective buyer can
use Autobytel to request a non-negotiable, ﬁxed-price oﬀer on a speciﬁc automobile. This
request is transmitted to the nearest dealer with which Autobytel has a geographically ex-
clusive agreement (in exchange for a subscription fee paid by the dealer to Autobytel). The
dealer commits to respond to buyer requests within 48 hours, and to oﬀer the buyer a posted
price equivalent to the best price that a skilled bargainer could negotiate directly at the
dealership.
Although the automobile industry is somewhat unique as a retail channel in which trans-
action prices are typically established through bargaining, the question of how the internet
has impacted the price setting process is of signiﬁcant interest because of the magnitude of
this market. According to the National Automobile Dealers Association, new car dealerships
in the United States sold over 16.9 million new vehicles in 2005 at a total value exceeding
$481 billion. This accounts for approximately 15.8 percent of the value of total retail trade
in the United States in 2005. Evidence of the role that online intermediaries play in this
market is provided by Scott Morton et. al. (2001) who ﬁnd that from a sample of nearly
325 thousand new automobile sales in California in 1999, 2.94 percent were purchased by
buyers who requested a price quote through Autobytel. Consumer surveys conducted by
J.D. Power and Associates also indicate the increasing role of the Internet in new automo-
bile purchases. The J.D. Power 2006 New Autoshopper.com Study reports that 67.5 percent
of new automobile buyers used the Internet to research their purchase, up from 54 percent
in 2000 (the approximate time period of the Scott Morton et. al. data). Viswanathan et.
al. (2005) shed some light on the type of information acquired online by car buyers (either
price information or product information). They ﬁnd that buyers who primarily search web
sites that provide price information (but not necessarily a price quote) pay a lower price, on
average, than buyers who purchase the same car without acquiring this information, while
2buyers who primarily search for product information pay an above average price. But their
empirical study does not provide direct evidence on the role of referral intermediaries.
To investigate the eﬀects of a referral system like Autobytel on the price setting process,
we develop a model of oligopolistic price competition in which one dealership has an exclu-
sive contract with a referral infomediary.5 Consumers are diﬀerentiated by their ability to
negotiate (as either strong or weak bargainers) and by whether or not they use the referral
service. Buyers who do not obtain a price quote from the referral service bargain directly
with a local dealer. Buyers who use the referral system obtain a ﬁxed price oﬀer from the
referred dealer and then decide to either purchase at that ﬁxed price or to reject the oﬀer
and bargain with a local dealer. Our objective is to theoretically investigate how the inter-
mediary inﬂuences equilibrium prices and how this depends upon market parameters such as
the percent of buyers who use the intermediary, the diﬀerence in buyer bargaining abilities,
the rate at which buyers arrive in the market, and the seller’s cost of attracting buyers.
Our framework is related to the broader literature investigating online intermediaries.
This literature has generally focused on environments in which sellers post prices in all
channels — both to buyers encountered directly and to buyers encountered through the in-
termediary. For example, Chen et al. (2002) analyze the impact of a referral infomediary
in a market with two retailers that compete for two types of buyers: loyal buyers who only
observe the price announced by one dealer, and shoppers who compare prices and buy from
the lowest price dealer. As in our model, the infomediary gives the referred dealer access to
a fraction of the competing dealer’s loyal customers and also enables the referred dealer to
price discriminate between loyal buyers and shoppers. Chen et al. ﬁnd that the proﬁts of
the referral infomediary can decline when its reach becomes too large. As more and more
buyers use the referral service, competition between dealers increases and drives their proﬁts
to zero. Their second ﬁnding is that the infomediary prefers to oﬀer geographically exclusive
contracts. Ghose et al. (2002) extend this model by adding a manufacturer that can pro-
vide non-exclusive referral services. They emphasize that direct (face-to-face) selling enables
5The intermediary oﬀers an exclusive contract with a single dealer to prevent severe (Bertrand) price
competition for referred buyers which would result if the intermediary referred a buyer to multiple dealers.
Such price competition would render the intermediary worthless.
3sellers to discover each buyer’s willingness-to-pay and to price discriminate, whereas online
selling makes price discrimination more diﬃcult. In the online retail channel, the seller has
less direct information on the characteristics of the buyer and is unable to infer the buyer’s
willingness-to-pay. This forces the dealer to quote a single price, whereas with oﬄine buyers
the seller can set diﬀerent prices depending on the observed willingness-to-pay of each buyer.
As in the models of Chen et. al. and Ghose et. al., the intermediary in our model
increases the proportion of customers with whom the referred dealer interacts, and dealers
are able to price discriminate between buyers encountered directly at the dealership. In
contrast to their models, we allow for the possibility of more than two dealers and we do
not assume that some buyers are fully informed.6 As a result, buyers encountered through
the referral system may be quoted a price which exceeds the average price paid by buyers
who bargain with the dealer directly. In particular, our framework highlights the importance
of heterogeneity in buyer bargaining ability in determining how the intermediary impacts
the price setting process. The intermediary provides buyers with lower prices (on average)
if the diﬀerence in buyer bargaining abilities is suﬃciently small. If the diﬀerence in buyer
bargaining abilities is large, then the price quoted by the intermediary is equivalent to the
price that the weakest bargainer would negotiate with his or her local dealer. However, weak
bargainers still have an incentive to use the intermediary because by doing so they avoid
having to negotiate a price with a dealer. Use of the intermediary also enables the buyer
to commit to his or her preferred car and option package, and to obtain a ﬁxed price oﬀer
on that car. The alternative of negotiating with the dealer is likely to be complicated by
haggling over multiple attributes including price, option packages and features (such as car
color), and ﬁnancing. If the buyer does not perceive that a better deal will be obtained by
negotiation with a local dealer, then the ﬁxed price oﬀered through the referral system will
be accepted.
Comparative statics analysis predicts that the price oﬀered by the intermediary will be
lower than the average negotiated price if either the cost to dealers of attracting buyers
6The presence of “shoppers” who are fully informed of all prices results in equilibrium mixed pricing
strategies as in Varian (1980). When considering the case of oﬄine markets, particularly for automobiles
where search and bargaining costs required to obtain a price quote can be quite high, the assumption that
some buyers are “shoppers” who receive price quotes from all sellers is not applicable.
4or the number of dealers in the market is suﬃciently large. Under such conditions, the
referred ﬁrm oﬀers a more competitive price through the intermediary in order to fully
take advantage of the increased market reach oﬀered by the intermediary. In addition, the
referral system is not be viable under certain market conditions which induce signiﬁcant
price reductions as non-referred dealers and the referred dealer compete for buyers who use
the referral system. If the value of the item is large (so the surplus over which the buyer
and seller are bargaining is large) and the diﬀerence in buyer bargaining abilities is small,
then the beneﬁt of the increased reach oﬀe r e db yt h ei n t e r m e d i a r yi sm o r et h a no ﬀset by the
reduction in equilibrium prices caused by dealers competing to attract buyers who use the
referral system. In this case, no dealer will contract with the intermediary.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the assumptions of the model and
establishes basic theoretical propositions. Section 3 extends the basic model to allow non-
referred dealers to advertise a lower price in order to compete with the referred dealer for
buyers who utilize the infomediary. Section 4 oﬀers concluding remarks.
2 The Model
We consider a simple market with N ﬁrms that sell a homogeneous good to consumers who
arrive in the market according to a Poisson process with rate λ.E a c hﬁrm incurs a search
cost c p e ru n i to ft i m e . T h i sc o s tc a nb et h o u g h to fa st h ec o s to fo p e r a t i n gt h ed e a l e r ’ s
business or as an advertising cost. Exactly one of the N ﬁrms, which we label ﬁrm A, has an
exclusive relationship with an information intermediary, or referral service. With probability
φ a buyer entering the market requests a price oﬀer through the intermediary and is referred
directly to ﬁrm A.F i r m A quotes this buyer a price r. With probability 1 − φ ab u y e r
entering the market does not use the intermediary and is allocated randomly to one of the
N ﬁrms. In this case the buyer negotiates with the dealer and pays a price that depends on
his or her ability to negotiate.
Buyers all have the same, ﬁxed reservation value v. This valuation may be thought of
as the manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP). This interpretation implies that if a
dealer attempts to negotiate a price which exceeds the MSRP, the buyer will always reject
5this dealer and purchase from another dealer at a price no greater than the MSRP.7 While
the MSRP establishes one potential upper bound on the price any buyer will pay, individual
sellers also have the ability to commit to a lower upper bound by advertising a price p
less than the MSRP. The buyer’s bargaining ability would then determine the split of the
surplus p − m generated by a trade, where m is the marginal cost of the good. Buyers
diﬀer with respect to bargaining ability. We do not explicitly model the negotiation process
between the buyer and seller. Rather, we assume that there are two buyer types identiﬁed
by their bargaining abilities γ1 and γ2, where γ1 >γ 2. Let δ ≡ γ1 − γ2 be the diﬀerence in
buyer bargaining ability. With probability α the buyer’s bargaining ability is γ1 and with
probability 1−α it is γ2. Dealers are unable to determine the buyer’s bargaining ability and
price discriminate, except through direct negotiation. When encountering a buyer through
the intermediary, ﬁrm A must quote a price based only on the information about the car
the buyer has requested, the buyer’s name, and an E-mail address or phone number. This
information does not enable ﬁrm A to determine a referred buyer’s bargaining ability. In
addition, a primary attraction of the referral system is the ability it oﬀers weak bargainers to
avoid haggling. In this respect, the intermediary provides ﬁrm A with a commitment device
which enables ﬁrm A to establish a reputation for haggle-free sales to buyers encountered
through the referral system. Negotiating with referred buyers would damage this reputation
and make use of the intermediary less attractive to the buyers who are most likely to purchase
through this channel. For these reasons, we treat the price r oﬀered through the referral
system as non-negotiable8 whereas the price advertised by the local dealer is subject to
7In the case of very popular automobile models the negotiated selling price may actually exceed the
suggested retail price. In this case the valuation v would simply represent the maximum amount the buyer
is willing to pay.
8The assumption that the referral price is non-negotiable does not perfectly ﬁt with the case of Autobytel.
Scott Morton et al. (2003) cite a report of J.D. Power and Associates that established that 42% of referred
dealerships claim that their initial price oﬀer to an Autobytel customer contains no room for negotiation,
42% quote a price but leave room for negotiation, while 14% quote a discounted price only if the customers
insists by e-mail or phone and 2% do not quote a price until the customer comes to the dealership. However,
it is not clear that buyers who use the referral system would choose to negotiate with ﬁrm A. Good bargainers
who reject r in favor of bargaining have no incentive to negotiate with ﬁrm A instead of negotiating with
and purchasing from a local dealer. (In practice, a strong bargainer may use the price quote received from
ﬁrm A in an attempt to increase his or her bargaining leverage with the local dealer.) Furthermore, as
demonstrated in the analysis of the model below, because a weak bargainer is unable to negotiate a price
better than r, he or she is better oﬀ accepting r and avoiding the disutility of engaging in a negotation which
will ultimately result in the same price. Scott Morton et al. (2003) observed that prices at a referred dealer
6bargaining.
2.1 When non-referred sellers are non strategic
We begin by considering the case in which non-referred sellers advertise a price of pn = v.
This is consistent with the results of Baye and Morgan (2001) and Chen et. al. (2002)
who demonstrate in a posted price setting that ﬁrms will always charge the monopoly price
to local, non-shopping customers. In this section, the non-referred sellers do not attempt
to advertise a price less than v in order to attract referred buyers away from ﬁrm A. In
the next section, we consider an alternative version of the model in which the non-referred
ﬁrms act strategically by advertising negotiable prices which may attract buyers who use the
intermediary away from ﬁrm A.
Given pn = v, a buyer who does not use the referral intermediary will negotiate a price
m + γi(v − m),i=1 ,2, and a buyer who uses the intermediary will only purchase from
ﬁrm A at the quoted price r if r<m+ γi(v − m). If r ≥ m + γi(v − m), then the buyer
will reject r and bargain with his local dealer. Without loss of generality, we let m =0 .
The buyers’ value v can be thought of as the surplus over which the buyer and the dealer
negotiate. When bargaining with a type γi buyer, the dealer receives a net revenue of γiv,
and the buyer’s surplus is (1 − γi)v.
Because buyers choose to use the intermediary with probability φ, the primary role of
the intermediary is to increase the rate at which buyers arrive at ﬁrm A (and simultaneously
reduce the rate at which buyers arrive at other dealer locations). In particular, rather than
encountering buyers at the rate λ/N, ﬁrm A encounters the fraction 1−φ of buyers who do
not use the intermediary with probability 1/N and the fraction φ who do use the intermediary
with probability 1. Given the overall arrival rate λ of buyers to the market, this implies that
t h er a t ea tw h i c hb u y e r sa r r i v ea tﬁrm A is λ((1 − φ)/N + φ)=˜ λ. Given this arrival rate,
let τ be the random time at which a buyer arrives at ﬁrm A. Noting that τ is an exponential
random variable with parameter ˜ λ, E [τ]=1 /˜ λ, and the expected cost incurred to interact
with a buyer is c/˜ λ.
are less dispersed for buyers referred to the dealer by Autobytel than for buyers who are not referred. This
suggests that the assumption that the referral price is non-negotiable is reasonable.
7Calculating ﬁrm A’s expected return requires knowing whether a buyer arrives at ﬁrm A
through the intermediary and is quoted a price r or arrives directly and negotiates a price
γiv. The probability that a buyer who arrives at ﬁrm A has been referred by the intermediary
is determined by Bayes’ rule as follows:
Pr(referral | arrive)=
φ · 1




1+( N − 1)φ
≡ φr.
Similarly, the probability that a buyer who arrives at ﬁrm A did not use the intermediary is
Pr(not referral | arrive) =
(1 − φ)/N




1+( N − 1)φ
≡ φnr.
Because there are only two bargaining types, ﬁrm A’s optimal referral price r will be either
r = γ1v or r = γ2v. If r = γ2v, then any buyer using the intermediary will purchase at the
price r. If r = γ1v, then weak bargainers will accept r, but good bargainers will reject r and
negotiate with a local dealer. Here, we assume that buyers who reject the referral price are
randomly allocated to one of the non-referred ﬁrms (but do not negotiate with ﬁrm A).9 If
a buyer rejects ﬁrm A’s oﬀer, then ﬁrm A resumes search for another buyer. Thus, ﬁrm A’s
return when oﬀering referred buyers a posted price of r = γ1v is
RA(γ1v)=−c/˜ λ + φr [αγ1v +( 1− α)RA(γ1v)] + φnr¯ γv
where ¯ γ ≡ αγ1+(1−α)γ2, so ¯ γv is the expected price the seller receives when bargaining with
a non-referred customer. Firm A incurs the cost −c/˜ λ to locate a buyer. With probability
φr that buyer is referred by the intermediary. In this case, with probability α the buyer is a
weak bargainer who accepts the oﬀer and pays γ1v while with probability 1−α the buyer is
a strong bargainer who rejects the oﬀer. This leaves the seller to resume search which has a
value of RA(γ1v).10 Thus, the expected value of a referred buyer is αγ1v +( 1− α)RA(γ1v).
With probability φnr the buyer is a local (not referred) buyer, and the expected transaction
price with a local buyer is ¯ γv. Solving for RA(γ1v) yields
RA(γ1v)=
−c/˜ λ + φrαγ1v + φnr¯ γv
1 − φr(1 − α)
. (1)
9This assumption is made to simplify the analysis (particularly the arrival rate) and is modiﬁed in section
3b e l o w .
10For simplicity, we assume that future returns are not discounted.
8Similarly, ﬁrm A’s return when oﬀering referred buyers a posted price of γ2v is
RA(γ2v)=−c/˜ λ + φrγ2v + φnr¯ γv. (2)
Finally, ﬁrm A can choose not to contract with the intermediary. In this case, the rate at
which buyers arrive at ﬁrm A is λ/N, and ﬁrm A’s return, which we denote by ˜ RA is
˜ RA = −Nc/λ+¯ γv. (3)
Proposition 1 Let δ ≡ γ1 − γ2 denote the diﬀerence in buyer bargaining abilities, and
ˆ δ ≡
(1 − α)Nc/λ
αv[φ(N − 2) + 2 − α(1 − φ)]
.
Firm A will quote buyers who are encountered through the referral system a low price of
r = γ2v if δ ≤ ˆ δ and a high price of r = γ1v if δ>ˆ δ.
Proof. See appendix.
Corollary 2 If δ ≤ ˆ δ then buyers who use the referral system pay a price r = γ2v which is
less than the average price ¯ γv paid by buyers who do not use the referral system.
If the diﬀerence in buyer bargaining abilities is small (δ<ˆ δ), then ﬁrm A will establish a
referral price r suﬃciently low to ensure that good bargainers who use the intermediary buy
at the referred price rather than visiting their local dealer to negotiate a price. However,
if the diﬀerence in buyer bargaining abilities is large (so δ>ˆ δ), then the referred ﬁrm
prefers to raise the referral price and to obtain a high mark-up on weak bargainers, rather
than retaining good bargainers with a low referral price. The implications of this result are
discussed in more detail in subsection 2.2 below.
Proposition 1 contrasts with the ﬁndings of Chen et. al. (2002) and Ghose et. al. (2002)
that the price paid through the referral system is systematically lower than the price paid
by consumers who do not use the referral system. However, both their models assume that
sellers use only a posted price mechanism. In our model, the price paid by consumers who
use the referral system may be either greater or less than the average price paid by consumers
who do not use the referral system (who bargain with the dealer directly). Assuming the
9diﬀerence in buyer bargaining abilities is suﬃciently small, our ﬁnding are consistent with
evidence provided by Scott Morton et. al. (2004) in which weak bargainers (whom they
label “cowards”) who use the referral system pay two percent less (on average) than cowards
who negotiate directly with a dealer, while good bargainers (labeled “cowboys”) obtain no
price advantage through the referral system. However, we would not expect this result to
hold if the diﬀerence in buyer bargaining abilities becomes suﬃciently large.
Proposition 3 The range of the values of the diﬀerence δ in buyer bargaining abilities, for
which ﬁrm A establishes a low referral price of r = γ2v is increasing in c and N, is decreasing
in λ, v, and α, and is decreasing in φ provided N>2.
Proof. This follows directly from signs of the derivative of ˆ δ with respect to the para-
meters c, N, λ, v, α, and φ. ¥
Combined with proposition 1, proposition 3 implies that for given bargaining abilities
γ1 and γ2, we will have δ<˜ δ, and ﬁrm A will set a high referral price if either the search
cost c or number N of ﬁrms is relatively low, or if the arrival rate λ, the consumer valuation
v, or the proportion φ of consumers who use the referral system is relatively high. These
comparative statics results have the following interpretation. A small value for c or N, and a
large value for λ or φ all reduce the referred ﬁrm’s incentive to set a low referral price because
they reduce the search cost associated with locating another buyer if the seller fails to reach
agreement with the current buyer. A large value of α implies a higher probability that a
randomly arriving buyer will be a weak bargainer who will pay a high price. As α increases,
the referred seller is more inclined to set a high referral price which is only attractive to
weak bargainers because the probability this price will be rejected and the ﬁrm will incur
additional search costs is decreasing in α. Finally, a higher buyer valuation, or net surplus,
v reduces the referred ﬁrm’s incentive to oﬀer a low referral price because the price discount
δv required to capture referred customers who are good bargainers is increasing in v.
102.2 Impact of the Referral System on Buyers
The empirical ﬁndings of Scott Morton et. al. indicate that Autobytel beneﬁts buyers by
providing a lower price to Autobytel users, on average, than the average price achieved by
buyers who negotiate directly with a dealer. Propositions 1 and 3 imply that in the simple
market considered here the price r paid by buyers who purchase through the referral system
will be less than the average price ¯ γv paid by buyers who do not use the referral system if
δ ≤ ˆ δ. Perhaps more interestingly, the above results suggest that the referral system will not
beneﬁt buyers under all market conditions.11 For example, as the arrival rate λ increases, the
critical value ˆ δ increases and ﬁrm A is less likely to oﬀer a discounted price (of γ2v) to users
of the referral system. This suggests that the referral system may not beneﬁtb u y e r sd u r i n g
periods of peak demand which correspond to a high arrival rate λ. Similarly, if the surplus
v (recall that v can be interpreted as the diﬀerence between the MSRP and the seller’s
marginal cost) is relatively large, then the seller is less likely to oﬀer a discount through the
referral system. For example, if the manufacturer oﬀers signiﬁcant incentives to the dealer,
which eﬀectively reduce m, then the cost to the dealer of oﬀering the best negotiated price
to all users of the referral system increases. This may cause the dealer to oﬀer less attractive
pricing to buyers using the referral system. Finally, an increase in the fraction φ of buyers
who use the referral system will reduce ﬁrm A’s incentive to oﬀer the price r = γ2v.
2.3 Viability of the Referral System
Contracting with the intermediary increases the rate at which buyers arrive at ﬁrm A, but
it also requires ﬁrm A to make a ﬁxed price oﬀer to buyers who use the referral system.
This could be detrimental to ﬁrm A for two reasons. First, if ﬁrm A sets r = γ2v, then it
will sell to the referred type γ1 buyers at a price below the price it would negotiate with
these buyers in the absence of a referral system. Second, if ﬁrm A sets r = γ1v, it will lose
sales to the referred type γ2 buyers, and this reduces the beneﬁt of an increased arrival rate
11It is reasonable to ask why buyers would use the referral system if they do not beneﬁt in terms of a lower
transaction price. Weak bargainers will have an incentive to request a quote because they can achieve the
same price, γ1v, without having to engage in a negotiation process. Even good bargainers would percieve a
beneﬁt from requesting a quote if they are not sure about the exact value of δ or ˆ δ so there is some possibility
that the referred ﬁrm will quote a price of r = γ2v and they can avoid negotiating a price. In addition,
strong bargainers may attempt to use the quoted price as a bargaining chit with a local dealer.
11oﬀered by the intermediary. To determine whether the referral system is viable, consider
the surplus S ≡ RA(γiv) − ˜ RA generated by the intermediary. Proposition 1 implies that
S = RA(γ2v) − ˜ RA if δ ≤ ˆ δ, and S = RA(γ1v) − ˜ RA if δ>ˆ δ.
Proposition 4 The surplus S generated by the intermediary is strictly positive, and S is
increasing in N and φ. In addition , if δ ≤ ˆ δ, then S is decreasing in δ and v, and if δ>ˆ δ,
then S is increasing in δ and v.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 4 implies that ﬁrm A will always prefer to enter into an agreement with the
intermediary (provided the intermediary’s fee does not exceed S). Furthermore, because the
surplus generated by the intermediary is strictly increasing in the proportion φ of buyers
who use the referral system, the intermediary has an incentive to maximize consumer par-
ticipation. The fact that S increases in N implies that intermediaries may be more likely to
appear in markets with many dealers. The dependence of the comparative static results for
the remaining parameters on whether δ is less than or greater than ˆ δ highlights the trade-oﬀ
between the increased arrival rate and corresponding reduction in search costs gained by
oﬀering a ﬁxed price to customers who use the intermediary, and the ability to extract the
maximum possible surplus the dealer can achieve by bargaining. For example, when the
diﬀerence in buyer bargaining abilities is small, so δ<ˆ δ, the impact of the reduced search
cost oﬀered by the intermediary is relatively more important than extracting more surplus
through bargaining because the diﬀerence δv in surplus to be gained by negotiating with a
weak bargainer is small.
3 When Local Sellers Compete for Buyers
In many markets, non-referred dealers are not passive and can take into account the behavior
of the referred ﬁrm. For example, non-referred dealers can anticipate the discount that buyers
who use the referral system will be quoted by ﬁrm A. We now consider the case in which local
dealers can advertise a price pn less than v in order to compete for buyers who use the referral
system. The ﬁr m se n g a g ei nt h ef o l l o w i n gg a m e .I nt h eﬁrst period, ﬁrm A chooses whether
12or not to enter into an exclusive agreement with the intermediary. If ﬁrm A chooses not to
use the referral system, when a buyer arrives at the market (according to the Poisson process
with rate λ), he is randomly allocated to and negotiates a price with one of the N dealers.
If ﬁrm A contracts with the intermediary, then the dealers engage in price competition à la
Stackelberg in which the non-referred ﬁrms act as leaders relative to ﬁrm A. The assumption
that the ﬁrm A is the follower is consistent with the fact that prices advertised by non-
referred dealers, typically printed in local newspapers or made public through other media,
a r em o r ed i ﬃcult to change than the referral price which ﬁrm A privately communicates to
each referred buyer via E-mail or a phone call. Each non-referred ﬁrm sets an advertised
price pn which serves as a starting point for the bargaining process. Firm A then establishes
its advertised price pA and referral price r. Buyers who use the referral system observe the
referral price r and either accept r or reject r and negotiate with a local dealer. Buyers who
do not use the referral system are randomly allocated to one of the N ﬁrms and negotiate a
price.
We assume the N − 1 non-referred sellers are symmetric and compete with ﬁrm A for
buyers who use the referral system. We consider only symmetric equilibria in which the
N − 1 non-referred ﬁrms all establish the same advertised price pn. As above, the price a
buyer bargains with the seller depends upon the buyer’s bargaining ability; a type γi buyer
negotiates a price of γipn with a non-referred seller.12 Rather than determining the share of
the total surplus v captured by the seller, the buyer’s bargaining ability γi now determines
the share of the advertised price captured by the seller. By advertising a price pn <v ,the
seller concedes an amount v − pn of the surplus. Such a concession will be optimal only if
the resulting loss in revenue induces some buyers who use the referral system to reject the
referral price in favor of bargaining with a local dealer.
3.1 All Buyers Use the Referral System
To simplify the analysis, and to focus on the impact of the referral system on the competitive
pricing decisions of each ﬁrm, in this subsection we assume that all buyers use the referral
system, so that φ =1 . After establishing this benchmark case, the case of φ ∈ (0,1) is
12Recall that without loss of generality the seller’s marginal cost m has be set to m =0 .
13discussed brieﬂy in subsection 3.2. Under the simplifying assumption that φ =1 , the prob-
ability φr that a buyer arriving at a dealer’s location has received a quote from the referred
dealer is φr =1 , 13 and the arrival rate ˜ λ = λ.
3.1.1 Pricing Strategy of the Referred Firm
Because a type γi buyer negotiates a price γipn when bargaining with his local dealer, the
optimal referred price r for ﬁrm A will be either r = γ1pn which captures only the weak
bargainers who use the referral system or r = γ2pn which captures all buyers who use the
referral system. Although establishing a low referral price of γ2pn enables ﬁrm A to sell the
item more quickly (thereby reducing its operating costs), it also entails an expected loss in
revenue of α(γ1−γ2)pn. This loss reﬂects the fact that if the referred buyer is a bad bargainer
(which occurs with probability α), then he is willing to purchase the item at the higher price
γ1pn. To explicitly account for the strategic interaction between the price advertised by
non-referred sellers and the rate at which buyers arrive and purchase from each seller, we
assume that in addition to its arrangement with the intermediary, ﬁrm A also serves as a
local dealer for some buyers. The probability that a referred buyer who rejects r is reassigned
to any given dealer (including ﬁrm A)i s1/N.
Firm A’s return when advertising a price pA
14 and quoting a referred price of r = γ1pn is







Solving for RA(pA,γ1pn) yields
RA(pA,γ1pn)=
−c/λ + αγ1pn +( 1− α)γ2pA/N
[1 + α(N − 1)]/N
. (4)
If ﬁrm A oﬀers a referral price of r = γ2pn, then it will capture all buyers, regardless of
its advertised price,15 and its return is
RA(pA,γ2pn)=−c/λ + γ2pn. (5)
13And the probability that a buyer arriving at a local dealer did not use the intermediary is φnr =0 .
14Note that only buyers who reject the referral price and who are in ﬁrm A’s local market actually observe
the price pA advertised by ﬁrm A. Thus, the probability that a given referred buyer ends up rejecting
r = γ1pn and trading with ﬁrm A through ﬁrm A’s local market is (1 − α) 1
N.
15Because all buyers are referred to ﬁrm A and will pay a price of at least γ2pn, ﬁrm A would never
advertise a price less than pn, so we can assume pA ≥ pn when ﬁrm A sets r = γ2pn.
14Establishing a high referral price of γ1pn which attracts only type 1 customers will be
optimal for ﬁrm A if and only if RA(v,γ1pn) ≥ RA(pA,γ2pn), or
−c/λ + αγ1pn +( 1− α)γ2pA/N
[1 + α(N − 1)]/N
≥− c/λ + γ2pn. (6)
Deﬁne ˜ pn as
˜ pn ≡
(1 − α)[(N − 1)c/λ − γ2pA]
αNγ1 − [1 + α(N − 1)]γ2
(7)
so that equation (6) is satisﬁed with equality when local dealers advertise pn =˜ pn. The
following lemma characterizes the optimal referral price r.
Lemma 5 Let ∆ ≡ αN
1+α(N−1) < 1.
First, suppose pA ≥ ((N − 1)c/λ)/γ2.
• If
γ2
γ1 ≤ ∆ (strong heterogeneity in customers’ bargaining abilities), then the optimal
referral price for ﬁrm A is r = γ1pn, regardless of the value of pn.
• If
γ2
γ1 > ∆ (small heterogeneity), then the optimal referral price is r = γ1pn if pn ≤ ˜ pn
and r = γ2pn if pn > ˜ pn.
Next, suppose pA < ((N − 1)c/λ)/γ2.
• If
γ2
γ1 ≤ ∆ (strong heterogeneity), then the optimal referral price for ﬁrm A is r = γ1pn
if pn ≥ ˜ pn, and r = γ2pn if pn < ˜ pn.
• If
γ2
γ1 > ∆ (small heterogeneity), then the optimal referral price is r = γ2pn regardless
of the value of pn.
Proof. See appendix.
This lemma demonstrates that the referral price established by ﬁrm A will depend both
upon the advertised price pA that ﬁrm A is able to establish for good bargainers who refuse
to purchase at the referral price r as well as on the diﬀerence in buyer bargaining abilities. If
ﬁrm A establishes a high advertised price pA ≥ ((N − 1)c/λ)/γ2 and the diﬀerence in buyer
bargaining abilities is large (so that γ2/γ1 is small), then ﬁrm A will never choose a low
referral price and will retain only the weak bargainers. Firm A will not compete to retain
15good bargainers for two reasons. First, the large diﬀerence in bargaining abilities implies
that the discount (γ1 − γ2)pn that must be oﬀered in order to retain the good bargainers is
large. Second, because the advertised price pA is high, the price that ﬁrm A negotiates with
the fraction 1/N of the good bargainers who reject r is high as well. If, however, there is
little diﬀerence in buyer bargaining abilities (γ2 close to γ1), then the discount (γ1 − γ2)pn
required to retain good bargainers through the referral system is small, and ﬁrm A will
compete to retain all good bargainers by setting r = γ2pn as long as the non-referred ﬁrms
do not price too competitively, ( i.e., as long as the non-referred ﬁrms advertise a price
pn > ˜ pn). But if pn ≤ ˜ pn, then it is optimal for ﬁrm A to establish a high referral price
(r = γ1pn) attractive only to the weak bargainers and to negotiate directly with its share
1/N of the good bargainers.
If ﬁrm A establishes a low advertised price pA < ((N − 1)c/λ)/γ2 and the diﬀerence
in buyer bargaining abilities is small, then ﬁrm A will always set r = γ2pn to retain good
bargainers. In this case, the cost incurred to retain good bargainers through the referral
system is small, whereas the expected beneﬁt from bargaining with good bargainers is low
(because pA is small). However, if the diﬀerence in bargaining abilities is large, then ﬁrm
A will only compete for good bargainers (r = γ2pn) if the non-referred ﬁrms establish a
relatively low advertised price ( pn < ˜ pn) so that the discount required to retain good
bargainers is small. If the non-referred ﬁrms set a high asking price of pn ≥ ˜ pn, then it is
optimal for ﬁrm A to concede good bargainers in order to charge a high referral price of
r = γ1pn to weak bargainers.
To determine the optimal advertised price for ﬁrm A, note that because pA serves only as
the starting point for negotiation with a good bargainer, ﬁrm A would like to set pA as high
as possible. Maximizing (4) with respect to pA subject to the constraint that pA ≤ v yields
pA = v. T h i si ss i m i l a rt ot h eo u t c o m ei nB a y ea n dM o r g a na n di nC h e ne t .a l .i nw h i c ht h e
referred seller sets the monopoly price for transactions with non-shopping, local customers.
However, as demonstrated in lemma 6, ﬁrm A w i l ln o ta l w a y sb ea b l et oa d v e r t i s epA = v
because good bargainers can always purchase at the referral price r which may be less than
γ2v. In particular, if r = γ1pn, then the good bargainers will negotiate with ﬁrm A only if








We now turn to the strategy of the non-referred ﬁrms to determine the conditions under
which pn ≤ ˜ pn.
3.1.2 Pricing Strategy of the Non-Referred Firms
Given the assumption that φ =1 , the non-referred ﬁrms must set a price pn which attracts
only the good bargainers away from ﬁrm A.I fn o n - r e f e r r e dﬁrms establish a price pn such that
good bargainers prefer the referral price, then the non-referred ﬁrms will have no customers.
Similarly, if the non-referred ﬁrms attract both good and bad bargainers away from ﬁrm A,
then ﬁrm A will have no customers. Neither of these cases can be sustained in equilibrium. A
unique stable conﬁguration is characterized by the referred ﬁrm selling to the bad bargainers
at a ﬁx e dp r i c ea n db a r g a i n i n gw i t haf r a c t i o n1/N of good bargainers and the non referred
ﬁrms bargaining with the remaining good bargainers. Consumers will arrive at any given
non-referred ﬁrm at the rate λ(1 − α)/N, and each non-referred ﬁrm’s return is
Rn(pn)=−cN/(λ(1 − α)) + γ2pn. (8)
Because non-referred ﬁr m sc a n n o ts e l la tap r i c epn >v ,v≥
cN/λ
γ2(1−α) is a necessary condition
for non-referred ﬁrms to participate in the market. In addition, non-referred ﬁrms must
advertise a price suﬃciently low to attract good bargainers away from ﬁrm A in order to
make any sales. In the analysis below, we allow for the possibility that non-referred ﬁrms
make no sales. This will occur for certain market parameters under which it is optimal
for ﬁrm A to adopt a limit pricing strategy which captures all buyers through the referral
system.
Proposition 7 Equilibrium Pricing Strategies
• If
γ2
γ1 ≤ ∆ (strong heterogeneity in customers’ bargaining abilities), then in equilibrium
the non-referred ﬁrms advertise a price pn = v,a n dﬁrm A advertises pA = v. If, in
17addition, v ≥
(1−α)(N−1)c/λ
αN(γ1−γ2) , then ﬁrm A sets a referral price of r = γ1v and sells only
to weak bargainers who use the referral system, while if v<
(1−α)(N−1)c/λ
αN(γ1−γ2) , then r = γ2v
and all buyers purchase through the referral system.
• If
γ2
γ1 > ∆ (small heterogeneity) and v ≥ ((N − 1)c/λ)/γ2, then in equilibrium the
non-referred ﬁrms set pn =m i n {v,
(1−α)(N−1)c/λ
(γ1−γ2)(1+α(N−1))}, and ﬁrm A advertises pA =
min{v,
γ1
γ2pn}, and sets r = γ1pn.
• If
γ2
γ1 > ∆ and v<((N − 1)c/λ)/γ2, then in equilibrium ﬁrm A sets r = γ2pn and
captures all buyers through the referral system, the non-referred ﬁrms can set any
advertised price pn ∈ ((c/λ)/γ2,v], and ﬁrm A will advertise pA ≥ pn.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 7 provides several insights into the impact of the referral system on new
automobile prices. Perhaps most notable, is the fact that the referral system may have no
impact on prices. As was the case in proposition 1, buyers may not realize a lower price
through the referral system if the diﬀerence in bargaining abilities is suﬃciently large. Indeed
if γ2/γ1 < ∆ and v is large, then the discount (γ1 − γ2)v in the referral price that ﬁrm A
must oﬀer to retain good bargainers is too large to justify competing for these buyers even
if non-referred ﬁrms advertise a price pn = v. There is no need for non-referred ﬁrms to
establish a low advertised price to attract good bargainers — ﬁrm A willingly concedes these
buyers. If ∆ >γ 2/γ1 and v is small (v<
(1−α)(N−1)c/λ
αN(γ1−γ2) ), then the magnitude of the discount
δv that ﬁrm A must oﬀer to retain good bargainers will be justiﬁed. In this case, a reduction
in pn by the non-referred dealers is futile because setting an advertised pn <vonly serves
to further reduce the discount δpn which ﬁrm A need oﬀer to attract good bargainers; ﬁrm
A captures all buyers with a referral price of r = γ2v. T h et h r e a to fl o s i n gb u y e r sp r o v i d e sa
suﬃcient incentive for ﬁrm A to set a referral price which is attractive to all buyers; r = γ2v
is a limit price that deters good bargainers from visiting their local dealers.
If v i sl a r g ea n dt h ed i ﬀerence in buyer bargaining abilities is suﬃciently small, then the
referral system causes non-referred ﬁrms to advertise pn <v ,and ﬁrm A is just indiﬀerent
between selling to all buyers with a referral price γ2pn, or selling to weak bargainers at a
18higher referral price of r = γ1pn and negotiating a price γ2pA with its share of the good
bargainers. As a result, in equilibrium the non-referred dealers oﬀer pn <v to capture the
good bargainers. Finally, if the diﬀerence in bargaining abilities is small and v is small, then
ﬁrm A adopts a limit price and retains all buyers who use the referral system by setting
r = γ2pn.
The following proposition summarizes the impact of the referral system on market prices.
Proposition 8 When all buyers use the referral system :
• If
γ2
γ1 ≤ ∆ (strong heterogeneity in customers’ bargaining abilities) and v ≥
(1−α)(N−1)c/λ
αN(γ1−γ2) ,
then each buyer type pays the same price in a market with a referral intermediary as
they would in a market without the intermediary.
• If
γ2
γ1 > ∆ and v>max{((N − 1)c/λ)/γ2,
(1−α)(N−1)c/λ
(γ1−γ2)(1+α(N−1))}, then weak bargainers
pay a ﬁxed price γ1pn which exceeds the average negotiated price in the market, but is
less than the price γ1v they would pay in a market without the intermediary. Strong
bargainers pay γ2pn <γ 2v, so all buyers pay a lower price in a market with the referral
intermediary.
• For all other ranges of v and γ2/γ1, ﬁrm A sets a referral of r ≤ γ2v, and all buyers
accept the price r oﬀered by ﬁrm A.T h ep r i c ep a i db yw e a kb a r g a i n e r si ss t r i c t l yl e s s
than the price they would pay in the absence of the referral intermediary, and the price
paid by strong bargainers is never greater than and may be less than the price they
would pay in the absence of the intermediary.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 8 follows directly from proposition 7 and highlights conditions under which
weak bargainers beneﬁt from the referral system. It implies that if the diﬀerence in buyer
bargaining abilities is large and the reservation value v is large, then the referral system will
not induce a reduction in the price paid by any buyer. However, if either v is small or buyer
bargaining abilities are suﬃciently close, then the referral system will reduce the average
price in the market. The results in proposition 8 also can be interpreted in the spirit of
19Wilde and Schwartz (1979) who show that shoppers generate a positive externality for non-
shoppers by forcing competition between sellers if and only if the proportion of shoppers in
the market exceeds a critical value. As the proportion α of weak bargainers goes to 0, ∆ → 0
as well, so
γ2
γ1 > ∆ and proposition 8 implies that the referral system reduces the average
market price.16 With the referral system, if the fraction of good bargainers is suﬃciently
large, then they confer a positive externality on all buyers by reducing prices for at least
some buyers.
3.1.3 Viability of the Referral System
Proposition 8 provides a necessary, but not suﬃcient condition for the referral system to
r e d u c et h ea v e r a g ep r i c ei nt h em a r k e tb e c a u s ew h e n
γ2
γ1 > ∆ is satisﬁed, it may be subop-
timal for ﬁrm A to contract with the intermediary. The referral system will be viable if all
dealers receive non-negative returns when adopting the optimal pricing strategies derived in
subsections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, and if ﬁrm A is better oﬀ contracting with the intermediary, i.e.,
if RA(v,γ1pn) > ˜ RA,where ˜ RA = −Nc/λ+¯ γv is ﬁrm A’s return without an intermediary.17
Proposition 9 When all buyers use the referral system :
• If
γ2
γ1 ≤ ∆ and v ≥
(1−α)(N−1)c/λ
αN(γ1−γ2) , then the surplus S = RA(v,γ1pn) − ˜ RA generated by








γ1 > ∆ and
(1−α)(N−1)c/λ
(γ1−γ2)(1+α(N−1)) >v≥ ((N − 1)c/λ)/γ2,
then the surplus S = RA(v,γ2pn) − ˜ RA is strictly positive and is increasing in N and
c, and decreasing in λ, v, and α.
16Note that as α → 1 (so most buyers are weak bargainers), ∆ → 1 and
(1−α)(N−1)c/λ





αN(γ1−γ2) and the referral system does not lead to a reduction in prices. However, as γ2 → γ1
(less heterogeneity in bargaining abilities), then
γ2
γ1 > ∆ and v<
(1−α)(N−1)c/λ
αN(γ1−γ2) so proposition 7 implies that
r<γ 2v and the referral system reduces the price paid by all buyers (relative to the price they would pay in
the absence of a referral intermediary).
17Note that because ˜ pn ≤ 0 when
γ2
γ1 ≥ ∆, and non-referred ﬁrms set pn ≤ ˜ pn when
γ2
γ1 < ∆, ﬁrm A will
never choose to establish a referral price of r = γ2pn, i.e., RA(v,γ1pn) >R A(v,γ2pn) for all pn set optimally
by the non-referred dealers. As result, non-existence of an equilibrium due to ﬁrm A pricing in a way that
causes the non-referred dealers to exit the market is not an issue.
20• If
γ2





, then the surplus S =




γ1−γ2 ≡ ˆ v and negative if
v>ˆ v.
Proof. See appendix.
The comparative statics results in proposition 9 are generally consistent with those in
proposition 4. However, in contrast to the results in proposition 4, when we allow for
competitive pricing by the non-referred dealers, S<0 is possible. If price competition for





then ﬁrm A will choose not to contract with the intermediary. As shown in proposition
9, this outcome will occur if bargaining abilities are close and v is relatively large. Under
these market conditions, there is strong competition to attract good bargainers. The high
reservation value v creates a large surplus which gives non-referred dealers a strong incentive
to attract good bargainers, while the small diﬀerence in buyer bargaining abilities gives
ﬁrm A a strong incentive to oﬀer the reduction (γ1 − γ2)pn in price needed to retain good
bargainers. The resulting reduction in transaction prices leads to a negative surplus from
the intermediary. However, as v decreases, dealers have less of an incentive to reduce prices
to attract or retain good bargainers, and it is possible for dealers to earn positive returns
even with pn <v .
3.2 Limited Reach of the Referral System, φ ∈ (0,1)
In this subsection we brieﬂy discuss the implications of the model in which non-referred sellers
can advertise a price pn <vin an attempt to compete with ﬁrm A for referred customers and
in which φ<1, so not all buyers use the referral system. The primary diﬀerence between
the model with φ<1 and the model with φ =1follows from the additional allocations of
buyers across ﬁrms that can occur when φ<1. Recall that if φ =1 , then in any equilibrium
the non-referred ﬁrms sell only to good bargainers or capture no buyers at all. When φ<1,
the non-referred ﬁrms sell to the fraction 1 − φ of customers who do not use the referral
system regardless of whether or not they choose to compete with ﬁrm A for good bargainers
who do use the referral system.
21The main impact of these additional potential outcomes is to slightly reduce the com-
petitive eﬀect of the referral system. Under some market conditions which result in lower
transaction prices when φ =1 , it is possible that with φ<1 non-referred dealers will concede
buyers who use the referral system to ﬁrm A in favor of setting a higher advertised price
pn = v and selling only to those buyers who do not use the referral system. Otherwise,
the intuition presented in the analysis above continues to apply. For example, focusing on
the fraction α of weak bargainers in the market, if α is large, then ﬁrm A will compete
to retain weak bargainers who use the referral system, but not to retain strong bargainers
because the fraction of strong bargainers is not suﬃciently large to justify such competition.
As a result, non-referred dealers advertise a price pn = v and ﬁrm A sets r = γ1v. As the
fraction α of weak bargainers decreases, all ﬁrms adopt a more competitive posture with
respect to the good bargainers. In equilibrium ﬁrm A sets a referral price of r = γ1pn in
order to sell to the weak bargainers who use the referral system, but the price advertised by
the non-referred dealers is suﬃciently low to deter ﬁrm A from reducing the referral price
to retain good bargainers. As the fraction of good bargainers increases further, ﬁrm A will
reduce r to retain both the strong and weak bargainers who use the referral system. In this
case, the non-referred dealers acquiesce by advertising a price of pn = v and selling only to
local customers, but ﬁrm A must set a low referral price of r = γ2v to induce all buyers
who use the referral system to purchase at the referral price r. Finally, if the diﬀerence in
buyer bargaining abilities is very large, then the referred dealer will not compete for good
bargainers encountered through the referral system. This result is intuitive. For a given pro-
portion of bad bargainers, if the heterogeneity in bargaining ability is suﬃciently large, then
the discount (γ1 −γ2)pn that the referred dealer would have to oﬀer in order to entice both
strong and weak bargainers to purchase through the referral system would not be justiﬁed.18
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper contributes to the growing literature that explores how online markets are im-
pacting the way in which prices are established. We consider the speciﬁcc a s eo ft h em a r k e t
18Determining conditions under which the referral system is viable is substantially more complex when
φ<1.
22for new automobiles in which consumers have traditionally negotiated a transaction price
with an individual dealer. The Internet has changed this market by enabling consumers to
obtain non-negotiable price quotes online. We construct a model in which an online inter-
mediary, like Autobytel.com, oﬀers an exclusive contract to refer buyers who request a price
oﬀer from Autobytel to one of N automobile dealers. The referred dealer oﬀers to sell the
good to buyers it encounters through the online intermediary at a ﬁxed price r and bargains
with buyers it encounters directly at its local dealership.
Our analysis suggests several conclusions regarding the impact of a referral infomediary
on the new automobile market. First, provided the diﬀerence in buyer bargaining abilities
is not too large, buyers who use the referral service will pay a lower price, on average, than
buyers who do not use the referral service. In this case, weak bargainers beneﬁtt h em o s tf r o m
the referral system. This corresponds with the empirical results of Scott Morton, Zettlemeyer
and Silva Risso (2001, 2003, 2004, 2006) who ﬁnd that buyers who use Autobytel pay 2%
less on average than buyers who do not use Autobytel.19 However, our model predicts that
these results could be overturned if the diﬀerence in buyer bargaining abilities increases,
the value of the item being purchased increases, or the fraction of consumers who request
a price quote through the referral intermediary becomes too large. This could explain the
only marginally signiﬁcant (at the 10% level) and small impact of Autobytel on prices in the
luxury car category obtained by Scott Morton et. al. (2001). For all other car categories the
coeﬃcient on the Autobytel variable is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Our results imply that the referred dealer will not oﬀer a below average price to buyers who
use the referral system if the value v of the item is suﬃciently large because the magnitude
of the price reduction required to entice good bargainers to purchase at the referral price
(instead of rejecting the referral price and bargaining with a local dealer) is increasing in v.
As a result, if v is suﬃciently large, which is most likely to be true for luxury cars, the referral
price will exceed the average negotiated price. Because the manufacturer’s suggested retail
19Scott-Morton et. al. also present empirical results consistent with bargaining theory. Car buyers who
visited several dealers and who obtained an oﬀer from a competing dealer paid less (0.6%). Similarly, buyers
who reported collecting information on the car they eventually purchased paid lower prices (0.9%). And
buyers who were willing to postpone their purchase should negotiations with the dealer break down paid
lower prices (0.6%). The combined savings of these eﬀects equalled one-third of the average dealer margin.
23price (MSRP) of each automobile is readily observed and is a proxy for v, further empirical
research investigating the impact of MSRP on the diﬀerence in the price paid by buyers
who do and do not use the referral intermediary may provide additional insights into how
intermediaries like Autobytel impact new automobile prices.
Our analysis also implies that in a market with an established intermediary, an increase
in the fraction φ of buyers who utilize the referral service or an increase in the number N of
ﬁrms in the market can actually lead to an increase in average prices. This occurs because
as φ increases, non-referred dealers lose a larger share of their local customers to the referred
ﬁrm. Non-referred dealers respond to this by reducing their advertised price in an attempt
to provide local customers a better deal than the ﬁxed price oﬀer obtained by using the
referral system. At some point, the referred ﬁrm is better oﬀ conceding good bargainers who
use the referral system and quoting a higher referral price which is attractive only to weak
bargainers. Given the steady increase in the percentage of buyers who use the Internet to
research new cars, our results suggest that over time the ability of referral intermediaries to
connect buyers with a dealer that oﬀers referred customers a price below the market average
will diminish. As this occurs, intermediaries will be forced to pursue other strategies to create
value for users. In fact, this already may be occurring in the market for new automobiles. As
opposed to past years in which Autobytel emphasized the price advantages of its website,20
Autobytel now emphasizes its product information content and automobile related services
such as ﬁnancing and insurance.
Our analysis has been restricted to the case of Autobytel and the automobile industry.
However, our approach could be used to analyze other types of intermediaries. For example,
a model of how Priceline.com or eBay has inﬂuenced the price setting process and market
equilibrium prices remains a topic for future research.
20At one point, the Autobytel home page referenced the work of Scott Morton et. al. and their estimate
of the 1.6% to 2.5% price savings realized by buyers who requested a quote through Autobytel.
245 Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . To determine whether ﬁrm A should establish a referral price r
of γ2v or γ1v, note that RA(γ2v) >R A(γ1v) if
−c/˜ λ + φrγ2v + φnr¯ γv >
−c/˜ λ + φrαγ1v + φnr¯ γv
1 − φr(1 − α)
.
This condition can be restated as




αv[φ(N − 2) + 2 − α(1 − φ)]
≡ ˆ δ.
¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . Equations (2) and (3) imply that RA(γ2v) − ˜ RA =
Nφ((N−1)c/λ−αvδ)
1+(N−1)φ which is greater than zero if φ 6=0and δ<
(N−1)c/λ
αv . Because ﬁrm A
sets r = γ2v if δ ≤ ˆ δ, if
(N−1)c/λ
αv > ˆ δ, then δ ≤ ˆ δ implies δ<
(N−1)c/λ
αv , and S>0 when δ ≤ ˆ δ.
(N−1)c/λ
αv > ˆ δ holds if (N −1)[φ(N − 2) + 2 − α(1 − φ)]−(1−α)N>0. Thus, the fact that
(N − 1)[φ(N − 2) + 2 − α(1 − φ)] − (1 − α)N
= N [1 − φ(1 − α)] − 2(1 − φ)+α(1 − φ)+φN(N − 2)
> (N − 2)(1 − φ)+α(1 − φ)+φN(N − 2) > 0,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that N [1 − φ(1 − α)] >N (1 − φ), veriﬁes
that S>0 when δ ≤ ˆ δ.
Equations (1) and (3) imply that RA(γ1v)− ˜ RA =
Nφ[(αN−1)c/λ+(1−α)αδv]
1−φ+αNφ which is greater
than zero if δ>
(1−αN)c/λ
(1−α)αv . Because ﬁrm A sets r = γ1v if δ>ˆ δ, if
(1−αN)c/λ
(1−α)αv < ˆ δ, then δ>ˆ δ
implies δ>
(1−αN)c/λ
(1−α)αv , and S>0 when δ>ˆ δ. Because ˆ δ>0,
(1−αN)c/λ
(1−α)αv < ˆ δ is always satisﬁed




2N>(1 − αN)[φ(N − 2) + 2 − α(1 − φ)]. (9)
25Because both sides of equation (9) are strictly decreasing in α, and because the inequality
is satisﬁed at both α =0and α =1 /N, equation (9) is satisﬁed for all α ∈ [0,1/N]. Thus,
δ>ˆ δ implies δ>
(1−αN)c/λ
(1−α)αv which veriﬁes that S>0 when δ>ˆ δ.
T h ec o m p a r a t i v es t a t i c sr e s u l t sf o l l o wf r o md i ﬀerentiation of the relevant expressions for
S. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 . Suppose pA ≥ ((N − 1)c/λ)/γ2 ≡ ˆ p, so the numerator of
˜ pn ≡
(1−α)[(N−1)c/λ−γ2v]







so that the denominator of ˜ pn is positive, then ˜ pn ≤ 0. Thus, because condition (6) is satisﬁed
if pn ≥ ˜ pn,w eh a v eRA(pA,γ1pn) ≥ RA(pA,γ2pn) if and only if pn ≥ ˜ pn. Thus, r = γ1pn for








so that the denominator of ˜ pn is negative, then ˜ pn > 0,a n dRA(pA,γ1pn) ≥ RA(pA,γ2pn) if
and only if pn ≤ ˜ pn. Thus, r = γ1pn if pn ≤ ˜ pn, and r = γ2pn if pn > ˜ pn.
Now suppose pA < ˆ p so the numerator of ˜ pn ≡
(1−α)[(N−1)c/λ−γ2v]
αNγ1−[1+α(N−1)]γ2 is strictly positive. If (10)
holds so that the denominator of ˜ pn is positive, then ˜ pn > 0, and RA(pA,γ1pn) ≥ RA(pA,γ2pn)
if and only if pn ≥ ˜ pn. Thus, r = γ1pn if pn ≥ ˜ pn,a n dr = γ2pn if pn < ˜ pn.
If equation (11) holds so that the denominator of ˜ pn is negative, then ˜ pn < 0, and
RA(pA,γ1pn) ≥ RA(pA,γ2pn) if and only if pn ≤ ˜ pn. Thus, r = γ2pn for any value of
pn ≥ 0. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 . Firm A’s ability to establish a high advertised price is limited by
the referral price r. If pA >
γ1
γ2pn, then because lemma 5 implies r ≤ γ1pn, all buyers would
prefer the referral price r over bargaining (which would result in a price of γ2pA >rfor a
good bargainer), so pA cannot exceed
γ1
γ2pn. In addition, by assumption the advertised price
cannot exceed v. Therefore, the advertised price pA must satisfy pA =m i n {v,
γ1
γ2pn}. ¥
Proof of Proposition 7. First, suppose that
γ2
γ1 ≤ ∆. Recall from lemma 5 that if
γ2/γ1 ≤ ∆ (buyers’ bargaining abilities are strongly heterogeneous), then ﬁrm A will set
r = γ1pn if pA > ((N − 1)c/λ)/γ2 ≡ ˆ p. B e c a u s et h i sr e s u l t si nt h en o n - r e f e r r e dﬁrms selling
26to all good bargainers, equation (8) implies that each non-referred ﬁrm’s return is strictly
increasing in pn, so non-referred ﬁrms will set pn = v. If γ2/γ1 ≤ ∆ and pA < ˆ p, then
lemma 5 implies that non-referred ﬁrms can only induce ﬁrm A to concede good bargainers
if pn ≥ ˜ pn, so it is optimal for the non-referred ﬁrms to advertise the highest possible price,
pn = v. Firm A will respond by setting pA = v. Substituting pA = v in equation (7) yields
˜ pn =
(1−α)[(N−1)c/λ−γ2v]
αNγ1−[1+α(N−1)]γ2 . If ˜ pn ≤ v, which simpliﬁes to v ≥
(1−α)(N−1)c/λ
αNv(γ1−γ2) , then lemma 5 implies
that ﬁrm A will set set r = γ1pn = γ1v. However, if v<
(1−α)(N−1)c/λ
αNv(γ1−γ2) , then ﬁrm A will set
r = γ2v and capture all buyers through the referral system.
Next, suppose
γ2
γ1 > ∆ and v ≥ ˆ p. In this case, RA(pA,γ1pn) ≥ RA(pA,γ2pn) if pn ≤ ˜ pn.
If ﬁrm A chooses an advertised price pA ≤ ˆ p, then ˜ pn ≤ 0, so pn > ˜ pn. Thus, ﬁrm A will
set r = γ2pn and capture all buyers through the referral system, and will earn a return of
RA(pA,γ2pn)=−c/λ +γ2pn. If ﬁrm A sets pA ≥ ˆ p, then ˜ pn ≥ 0, and non-referred ﬁrms will
set pn =m i n {˜ pn,v} (so pn ≤ ˜ pn) in order to induce ﬁrm A to concede the good bargainers.
Assuming non-referred ﬁrms set pn =˜ pn, ﬁrm A’s return is maximized when ˜ pn is as large
as possible. Because ˜ pn is an increasing function of pA when
γ2
γ1 > ∆ and pA ≥ ˆ p, ﬁrm





γ2 ˜ pn into equation (7) and solving for ˜ pn yields ˜ pn =
(1−α)(N−1)c/λ
(γ1−γ2)(1+α(N−1)).





(γ1−γ2)(1+α(N−1))}, and the optimal referral price is r = γ1pn. Finally, to see that
ﬁrm A prefers to advertise pA ≥ ˆ p if v ≥
(1−α)(N−1)c/λ
(γ1−γ2)(1+α(N−1)), note that for any price ˜ pn
advertised by the non-referred ﬁrms, equations (4) and (5) imply that ﬁrm A’s return from
setting r = γ1˜ pn and pA =
γ1
γ2 ˜ pn is greater than or equal to the return from setting r = γ2˜ pn
if
−Nc/λ+ αNγ1˜ pn +( 1− α)γ1˜ pn
1+α(N − 1)
≥− c/λ + γ2˜ pn
or ˜ pn ≥
(1−α)(N−1)c/λ
(γ1−γ2)(1+α(N−1)) which holds if v ≥
(1−α)(N−1)c/λ
(γ1−γ2)(1+α(N−1)). However, if v<
(1−α)(N−1)c/λ
(γ1−γ2)(1+α(N−1)),
then for any price pn advertised by the non-referred ﬁrms, it will be optimal for ﬁrm A to
set r = γ2pn to capture all buyers through the referral system.
Finally, suppose
γ2
γ1 > ∆ and ˆ p>v .Because lemma 6 implies pA ≤ v, ﬁrm A is forced
to set pA < ˆ p, and lemma 5 implies r = γ2pn. The non-referred ﬁrms make no sales and
27have no single optimal pricing strategy. Any price pn ∈ ((c/λ)/γ2,v] that does not exceed v
and yields a positive return for ﬁrm A is possible. Furthermore, ﬁrm A cannot increase its
proﬁt by advertising a price pA <p n, and price pA ∈ [pn,min{v,
γ1
γ2pn}] results in all buyers
purchasing through the referral system. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 . In the absence of the referral system, the average market price
is ¯ γv. From proposition 7, if
γ2
γ1 ≤ ∆ and v ≥
(1−α)(N−1)c/λ
αN(γ1−γ2) , then pA = v and r = γ1v, and
the average market price is ¯ γv. If
γ2
γ1 > ∆ and v>max{((N − 1)c/λ)/γ2,
(1−α)(N−1)c/λ
(γ1−γ2)(1+α(N−1))},
then proposition 7 implies pn =
(1−α)(N−1)c/λ
(γ1−γ2)(1+α(N−1)) <v ,weak bargainers purchase through the
referral system at a price r = γ1pn <γ 1v, and good bargainers purchase from non-referred
dealers at a price γ2pn. The average market price is ¯ γpn < ¯ γv, but weak bargainers pay
γ1pn > ¯ γpn. F o ra l lo t h e rr a n g e so fv and γ2/γ1 proposition 7 implies all buyers purchase
from ﬁrm A at the price r = γ2v. ¥
Proof of Proposition 9. The results follow from the fact that if
γ2
γ1 ≤ ∆ and
v ≥
(1−α)(N−1)c/λ
αN(γ1−γ2) , then proposition 7 implies pA = v and r = γ1v, so
S = RA(v,γ1v) − ˜ RA =




α(N − 1)(v(γ1 − ¯ γ)+c/λ)
1+α(N − 1)
> 0.
T h ec o m p a r a t i v es t a t i c sr e s u l t sf o l l o wf r o md i ﬀerentiation of this expression for S.
Similarly, if
γ2




γ1 > ∆ and
(1−α)(N−1)c/λ
(γ1−γ2)(1+α(N−1)) >v≥
((N − 1)c/λ)/γ2, then proposition proposition 7 implies r = γ2v so
S = RA(v,γ2v) − ˜ RA = −c/λ + γ2v − (−Nc/λ+¯ γv)
=( N − 1)c/λ − α(γ1 − γ2)v
which is positive if v<(N − 1)c/λ/(α(γ1 − γ2)) which always holds because the restric-
tions on v imply v<
(1−α)(N−1)c/λ
αN(γ1−γ2) . Again, comparative statics results follow directly from
diﬀerentiation of the expression for S.
Suppose
γ2






7 implies that pn =
(1−α)(N−1)c/λ
(γ1−γ2)(1+α(N−1)) and pA =
γ1
γ2pn. Substituting pA =
γ1
γ2pn into S =
28RA(pA,γ1pn) − ˜ RA yields S =
pnγ1(1+α(N−1))+αN(N−1)c/λ
1+α(N−1) − ¯ γv which is positive if and only if
pn >
−αN(N − 1)c/λ







(γ1−γ2)(1+α(N−1)) and simplifying, this expression can be restated as
v<
(N − 1)c/λ
¯ γ(1 + α(N − 1))
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